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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
     Appellants Sergeant Michael Weston, Captain Douglas Schlegel, Captain 
Edward 
Zukasky, Chief Lawrence Palmer, and Mayor Thomas Goldsmith are defendants 
together 
with Officer John Remaley, Officer Jesse Sollman, and the City of Easton, 
Pennsylvania, 
in an action brought by appellees Mitchell Ricker, Alessio Zagra, and Eric 
Freeman.  
Appellants appeal from the order of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania denying their motion for summary judgment insofar 
as that order 
denied them qualified immunity on the claims brought under 42 U.S.C.  
1983.  The 
District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1331 and 1343(a), and 
we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1291 and the collateral order doctrine 
although, as will 
become clear, we lack jurisdiction to consider the factual components of 
the District 
Court's holding.  For the reasons which follow, we will reverse as to 
appellants Zukasky, 
Palmer, and Goldsmith and will dismiss the appeal of appellants Weston and 
Schlegel for 
lack of jurisdiction.   
                           I.  FACTS 
     The facts underlying this appeal are hotly disputed, and we view 
those facts, as we 
must, in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties   Ricker, 
Zagra, and 
Freeman.  On November 27, 1997, the annual Thanksgiving Day football game 
between 
the Phillipsburg, New Jersey and Easton, Pennsylvania high school teams 
was held at 
Lafayette College in Easton.  After Phillipsburg won, the Phillipsburg 
fans, mostly 
teenagers and young adults, started the traditional walk back to New 
Jersey across the 
Delaware River via the Route 22 toll bridge.  Included in the crowd of 
people were 
Ricker, Zagra, and Freeman.  As the crowd made its way across the bridge, 
pedestrian 
traffic began to spill over from the sidewalks to the roadway.  This 
created a hazard for 
cars driving over the bridge, and the bridge was soon closed to vehicular 
traffic.   
     Five police officers from Easton's K-9 Unit and their dogs were 
present on the 
bridge.  Schlegel had deployed them in anticipation of problems and in 
order to direct the 
crowd's movement across the bridge.  Schlegel did not, however, assign any 
other 
officers to the bridge to support the K-9 Unit despite his fear, and later 
knowledge, of 
dangerous conditions.  Schlegel was the only Easton police officer on the 
bridge outside 
of the five K-9 officers.  
     Of the five K-9 officers, three were defendants Remaley and Sollman 
and 
appellant Weston.  Weston was the officer in charge of the K-9 Unit and 
was responsible 
for issuing all orders.  Upon his instruction, the K-9 Unit formed a line 
across the Easton 
side of the bridge.  A group of approximately two to three hundred people 
slowly formed 
in the center of the bridge.  The officers and their dogs charged the 
crowd in order to 
disperse it.  During the ensuing melee, Ricker, Zagra, and Freeman were 
injured from 
either dog bites, repeated baton blows, or both. 
     Zagra and his brother were part of the crowd charged by the K-9 Unit.  
When they 
saw the dogs and people panicking, they stopped moving and sought safety 
in the rear.  
Remaley yelled at Zagra to start moving and to get off the bridge.  Zagra 
tried to explain 
to the officer that he and his brother had nowhere to go, but Remaley was 
unyielding.  He 
hit Zagra on the right shoulder with his baton, started to shout 
obscenities, and ordered 
him "to get the fuck off the bridge right now" and to "move, scumbag, now 
fucking 
move."  (A. 327-28; Zagra Dep. at 40)  When Zagra repeated that he was 
unable to move, 
Remaley took out his baton and struck Zagra numerous times in the legs in 
an effort to 
"teach" Zagra how to walk.  The blows and obscenities continued until 
Remaley was 
called away by Weston.   
     Ricker and his friends were walking in the road next to the bridge's 
northern 
sidewalk when they saw the officers charge the crowd.  Frightened, Ricker 
tried to move 
out of the way.  As he was climbing over the concrete barrier that 
separates the road from 
the sidewalk, he was struck in the back by Weston's baton.  While hunched 
over the 
barrier, Ricker was bit by Weston's dog in the back of the left thigh.  
The dog continued 
to grab Ricker's leg until several pedestrians were able to pull Ricker 
over the barrier to 
safety.  At no time, did Weston place Ricker under arrest or order him to 
lie down or stop. 
     Meanwhile, Freeman was walking with his friends on the bridge's 
northern 
sidewalk when he observed the K-9 officers charge the crowd and attack 
Zagra and 
Ricker.  When he reached the area where Ricker was being attacked, he saw 
two officers 
and their dogs.  Both pairs jumped over the concrete barrier and started 
running in 
Freeman's direction.  One pair ran by Freeman, but the other stopped in 
front of him.  The 
dog began jumping and barking in Freeman's face and nicked Freeman's left 
arm.  
Freeman tried to run and to jump out of the dog's way, but the dog grabbed 
the back of 
his right leg and pulled him to the ground.  Freeman eventually struggled 
free.  The 
officer, later identified as Sollman, jumped back over the barrier and 
continued down the 
road without arresting Freeman.   
     With his leg ripped open, Freeman sought immediate medical attention 
from the 
first Phillipsburg police officer he spotted.  The officer told him to 
keep walking, so he 
went to a second officer.  As he lifted his leg to show the officer his 
wound, Schlegel 
spotted Freeman and started running after him.  Afraid, Freeman began 
running towards 
Phillipsburg until his leg quit.  Schlegel caught, tackled, and arrested 
him.  With the help 
of two other officers, Schlegel dragged Freeman to the middle of the 
bridge where his 
patrol car was parked.  Freeman was transported to the Easton Police 
Department 
headquarters where he was booked on charges of riot, failure of disorderly 
persons to 
disperse, obstructing highways, aggravated assault, simple assault, 
resisting arrest, and 
escape.  Freeman was eventually acquitted of all charges.  
     In the months following the attacks, Goldsmith and Palmer assigned 
Zukasky to 
conduct an internal investigation of the bridge incident.  Zukasky's 
report was allegedly 
incomplete, and despite its conclusion that certain of the officers had 
violated department 
policies, Palmer disciplined only Remaley for using foul language.  
     Even before the bridge incident, Goldsmith and Palmer were aware of 
past 
episodes of excessive force by officers in the police department.  When 
Goldsmith 
became mayor, he was advised of twenty-five outstanding lawsuits for 
excessive force.  
In particular, Schlegel was the subject of several excessive force 
actions.  Additionally, he 
had been terminated by the police department as a result of an off-duty 
incident of 
violence, although he was eventually reinstated.  Nonetheless, Goldsmith, 
upon Palmer's 
recommendation, promoted Schlegel to Captain of Field Services and placed 
him in 
command on November 27, 1997.   
                        II.  DISCUSSION 
     The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials 
performing 
discretionary acts from civil liability so long as their conduct "does not 
violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have 
known."  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  Accordingly, 
qualified 
immunity is unavailable where (1) the plaintiff has alleged a violation of 
an actual 
constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established when 
allegedly violated.  
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).  Under the collateral order 
doctrine, an order 
denying qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage may be 
immediately 
appealable if the denial turned on a question of law.  Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
530 (1985); Eddy v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, 256 F.3d 204, 
208 (3d Cir. 
2001).  To the extent a question of law is presented, this Court has 
jurisdiction and 
exercises plenary review.  Eddy, 256 F.3d at 208.  In exercising such 
review, the Court 
adopts the facts assumed by the district court when denying the motion for 
summary 
judgment.  Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995).  If, however, the 
denial rested on 
a determination that there were genuine issues of material fact for trial, 
the question of 
evidentiary sufficiency is not immediately appealable.  Id. at 313.   
     We note at the outset the difficulty we have had in parsing what 
precisely is 
alleged against each appellant   Freeman's Count 9, for example, entitled 
"Violation of 
Constitutional Rights," is essentially a blunderbuss count, nonspecific as 
to what any of 
the numerous defendants are alleged to have done.  Similarly, we have had 
difficulty 
because appellants Weston and Schlegel sought qualified immunity as to all 
Section 1983 
claims except the Fourth Amendment claims in which they were implicated by 
virtue of 
direct physical contact with one or more of the appellees.  Thus, Weston 
asserted 
immunity vis-a-vis Freeman's and Zagra's complaints, but not Ricker's, and 
Schlegel 
asserted immunity vis-a-vis Zagra's and Ricker's complaints, but not 
Freeman's. In a 
nutshell, Weston and Schlegel seem to believe, at least as to the Fourth 
Amendment 
claims, that they should be immunized for any actions   or inactions   
which did not 
involve direct physical contact.   
     The District Court was similarly hampered in its ability to apply the 
doctrine of 
qualified immunity.   
          [O]ur analysis on this analysis has been handicapped by the 
extraordinary 
     absence of specificity in all parties' briefs.  The parties persist 
in the 
     practice of arguing through conclusory statements supported by 
generalized 
     reference to the extensive statements of fact with which they each 
open 
     their briefs. This places us in the unwelcome position of having to 
search 
     through the parties' claimed fact sets in search of the information 
that 
     supports their arguments.  While we will engage in this enterprise to 
a 
     certain extent, as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
observed 
     in a slightly different context, "[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting 
for 
     truffles buried in briefs," United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 
956 (7th 
     Cir. 1991) (per curiam).  
 
Memo. at 29 n.31 attached to Appellants' Br. (hereinafter "Memo").  
Moreover, the Court 
continued, the motion for qualified immunity focused on defendants' 
actions but failed to 
address a number of the theories that plaintiffs were pursuing and, thus, 
even if 
defendants' arguments insofar as they made them were correct, "it would 
not necessarily 
justify a grant of qualified immunity . . ."  Id. at 30-31.  It appears, 
therefore, that because 
there was alleged but unaddressed wrongdoing, the District Court declined 
to find that 
qualified immunity was in order.   
     The Court, nonetheless, went on to review some of the facts elicited 
through 
discovery and found, as to Sergeant Weston and Captain Schlegel, that the 
evidence was 
conflicting.   
               We begin with Sergeant Weston.  As defendants note, 
Sergeant 
     Weston is not alleged to have physically assaulted Zagra or Freeman.  
     However, he is the officer in charge of the K-9 units and it was he 
who gave 
     the order for the K-9 units to charge the crowd, an order that 
precipitated 
     the events at issue here.  On the conflicting evidence before us 
regarding the 
     incident, we cannot conclude that these actions were objectively 
reasonable 
     in view of the federal law surrounding the use of the police force. 
 
               Captain Schlegel's report of the incident states that 
because of the 
     crowd's behavior at the game, he anticipated problems on the bridge.  
To 
     address his concern, he sent two additional K-9 units to the bridge 
to add to 
     the three units who had previously been assigned to the bridge . . .  
Schlegel 
     did not, however, assign any other officers to support the K-9 units, 
     although he himself was later present on the bridge.  While on the 
bridge, 
     he chased, tackled, and arrested plaintiff Freeman in part because he 
was 
     displaying a bite on his leg, which Schlegel believed to demonstrate 
that 
     Freeman had previously engaged in illegal activity.  Again, on the 
     conflicted facts before us we cannot say that these acts were 
objectively 
     reasonable.   
 
Memo. at 31-32 n.34 (emphasis added).   
     The District Court, therefore, found genuine issues regarding facts 
that were 
material to determining whether Weston's and Schlegel's actions were 
objectively 
reasonable.  "Under Johnson v. Jones, supra, this is a question of 
evidentiary sufficiency 
that we may not address in this [collateral order] appeal."  Eddy, 256 
F.3d at 211. As 
Justice Ginsburg put it, "if an excessive force claim turns on which of 
two conflicting 
stories best captures what happened on the street, Graham [v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386 
(1989)] will not permit summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
official; . . . [A] trial 
must be had."  Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2164 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in 
the judgment). We, therefore, dismiss the appeals of Weston and Schlegel 
for lack of 
jurisdiction and leave for trial the determination of whether their 
actions and/or inactions 
at the bridge on that Thanksgiving Day violated the Fourth Amendment 
rights of Ricker, 
Zagra, and/or Freeman by virtue of excessive force they themselves used, 
condoned, or 
ordered.  
     The appeals of Captain Zukasky, Chief Palmer, and Mayor Goldsmith 
stand on a 
different footing and are properly before us because summary judgment was 
not denied 
on the basis of conflicting evidence.  Rather, summary judgment was denied 
as to them 
because, as noted earlier, all of the allegations of wrongdoing had not 
been addressed by 
these appellants and because, as to those allegations the Court discussed, 
qualified 
immunity, as a matter of law, was not warranted.  We conclude that the 
District Court 
erred.  
     One or more of the appellees allege that, among other lesser wrongs, 
appellants 
Zukasky, Palmer, and Goldsmith encouraged or acquiesced in the K-9 Unit's 
unlawful 
conduct when one or more of them promoted Schlegel to captain despite his 
record of 
misconduct, assigned Remaley to the K-9 Unit despite his prior violent 
off-duty and on- 
duty episodes, conducted a superficial investigation of the bridge 
incident, and failed to 
reprimand the officers for their conduct in that incident.  Zukasky, 
Palmer, and Goldsmith 
were not at the bridge on the day in question and liability is sought as 
to them because of 
acts they should or should not have taken in some sort of supervisory or 
policymaking 
capacity before and/or after the bridge incident.   
      A supervisor may be liable under 42 U.S.C.  1983 for his or her 
subordinate's 
unlawful conduct if he or she directed, encouraged, tolerated, or 
acquiesced in that 
conduct.  Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Blanche Road 
Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 1995); Baker v. Monroe 
Twp., 50 
F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995).  For liability to attach, however, 
there must exist a 
causal link between the supervisor's action or inaction and the 
plaintiff's injury.  Brown, 
269 F.3d at 216.  "[I]t is not enough for a plaintiff to argue that the 
constitutionally 
cognizable injury would not have occurred if the superior had done more 
than he or she 
did."  Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).  Rather, 
there must exist a 
close relationship between the supervisor's deficient conduct and the 
ultimate injury.  
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989); Sample, 885 F.2d at 
1118.  In other 
words, the supervisor's acts must be the "moving force [behind] the 
constitutional 
violation."  Harris, 489 U.S. at 389 (citations omitted).  The supervisor 
must be directly 
and actively involved in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.  
Brown v. 
                                                                 
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1119-20 (3d Cir. 1990).                  
     Zukasky, Palmer, and Goldsmith had no involvement in the K-9 
officers' allegedly 
unconstitutional conduct on the bridge that day.  Liability against 
Zukasky is asserted 
only by Freeman and is based solely on Zukasky's role in investigating the 
incident.  
Freeman alleges that the investigation was inadequate primarily because 
Zukasky did not 
question all of the possible witnesses and failed to use all of the police 
department's 
investigators, but does not explain how any of this resulted in or 
aggravated his injuries 
from dog bites.  Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the K-9 officers 
were not 
disciplined as a result of Zukasky's investigation, that investigation did 
not in any way 
cause Freeman's injuries.  Consequently, Zukasky was not a "moving force" 
behind those 
injuries, and no constitutional right of Freeman's was violated.  
     We reach the same conclusion as to Palmer and Goldsmith.  The 
undisputed facts 
indicate that they knew about Schlegel's prior misconduct but nonetheless 
promoted him 
to Captain of Field Services.  They also knew of Remaley's violent 
episodes but 
permitted him to be a member of the K-9 Unit.  These acts are, as a matter 
of law, 
insufficient to constitute the requisite direct involvement in appellees' 
injuries.  
Moreover, there is no evidence indicating that Palmer and Goldsmith were 
aware of any 
previous mishandling of police dogs by the officers.  In earlier years, 
the K-9 Unit had 
been deployed following the Thanksgiving football game without incident.  
Importantly, 
neither Palmer nor Goldsmith were aware of the attacks in question until 
after they 
occurred.  At that time, they ordered an investigation but ultimately 
chose not to 
discipline the officers involved, even though it appears that Zukasky had 
recommended 
that at least certain of the officers be disciplined.  This decision not 
to discipline the 
officers does not amount to active involvement in appellees' injuries 
given that all of the 
injuries occurred before the decision.  There is simply no causal link 
between those 
injuries and what Palmer and Goldsmith did or did not do.   
     Because under the facts as appellees allege them to be there is, as a 
matter of law, 
an insufficient causal connection to appellees' injuries as against 
appellants Zukasky, 
Palmer, and Goldsmith, appellees have not alleged a violation of their 
constitutional 
rights, and those appellants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of 
qualified 
immunity should have been granted.  
                        III.  CONCLUSION 
     The appeals of Sergeant Weston and Captain Schlegel will be dismissed 
for lack of 
jurisdiction.  The order of the District Court will be reversed insofar as 
it denied summary 
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to Captain Zukasky, Chief 
Palmer, and 
Mayor Goldsmith. The case will be remanded for further proceedings in 
accordance with 
this opinion.   
 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
     Kindly file the foregoing Opinion. 
                          
                                    /s/   Maryanne Trump Barry  
                                            Circuit Judge 
